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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether excess cash, board attributes (i.e. board
size, board independence and CEO duality) and insider ownership affects the value of the
firm. Data were taken from annual reports of non-financial firms listed on the Karachi Stock
Exchange (KSE) Pakistan during 2008-2012. Pooled ordinary least squares method used to
estimate the effects of excess cash and internal governance indicators on the value of the
firm. Our results indicate that excess cash is significantly negatively related to firm value.
Excess cash along with board size is significant and negatively related to firm value. Excess
cash along with insider ownership is significant and negatively related to firm value. Control
variables namely leverage and dividends are positively while firm size is negatively related to
firm value in all regressions. In sum, empirical results indicate that excess cash, board size
and insider ownership have material effects on the value of the firm. Moreover, findings of
this study provide support to managers to understand the impact of excess cash and internal
governance measures on firm value. In addition, findings provide support to regulatory
authorities to frame regulations that improve the level of corporate governance in the country.
JEL Classification: G32
Keywords: Board size, Board independence, CEO duality, Excess cash, Firm value, Insider
ownership
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cash is the oil that lubricates the economy. Finance literature suggests that firms generally
hold cash for transactional motives, safety motives and speculative motive. Jensen (1986,
p.323) suggests that managers have incentives to cause their firms to grow beyond the
optimal size because growth increases their power by increasing the resources under their
control. However, conflicts between managers and shareholders become problematic when
organizations generate substantial free cash. The issue is how to motivate the managers to
dispense free cash among the shareholders rather than investing it at below the cost of capital
or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies. Debt can be an effective substitute for
dividends because by issuing debt managers are bound to fulfil their promise to pay out
future cash flows in a way that cannot be attained simply by dividend increases. Moreover,
debt gives right to the lenders to take the firm into a bankruptcy court if managers do not
keep their promise. Kim et al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999) suggests that firms determine
their optimal cash balance through a trade-off between costs and benefits of holding an
additional dollar of cash. Alternatively, Dittmar et al. (2003) observed that firms in countries
with weak external legal protection hold more cash than firms in countries where legal
protection is strong. Harford et al. (2008) suggests that firms with weak shareholder rights
protection hold little cash than firms with strong shareholder rights protection.
Several empirical studies have been conducted in developed countries to investigate
the effects of cash holdings along with internal governance measures on the value of the firm.
Alternatively, little is known about the effects of cash holdings and governance measures on
firm value in developing countries. More importantly, results of earlier empirical studies are
both inconsistent and unclear. Thus equivocal findings and a little research in developing
countries in general and Pakistan in particular suggest the need for this empirical
investigation. Notably, to the authors’ knowledge no study has yet explored the effects of
excess cash and internal governance measures on firm value in Pakistan. We are sure that
findings of this study will not only fill a gap in the literature but also provide some support to
the managers to understand the effects of excess cash along with internal governance
indicators on firm value. Moreover, findings of this study provide support to the regulatory
authorities in understanding the effectiveness of the code of corporate governance (CCG) and
formulating new regulations that can improve the level of corporate governance in Pakistan.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review.
Section 3 describes the data and research methodology. Section 4 presents regression results.
Section 5 provides a discussion on the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 presents
conclusion of the study and highlight the avenues for future research.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
A number empirical studies have explored the effects of cash and governance measures on
firm value but unfortunately findings of these studies are mixed. For instance, Stulz (1988)
conducted a study to empirically investigate how managerial control of voting rights affects
the firm value and financing policy. His findings indicate that an increase in the fraction of
voting rights controlled by the management decreases the probability of a successful tender
offer and increases the premium offer if a tender offer is made. Moreover, his findings
suggest that management can alter the proportion of the votes it controls through capital
structure changes, the acquisition of shareholder clienteles and introducing amendments in
the charter. Weisbach (1988) analyzed the data of 495 firms listed on NYSE during 19771980 to investigate the relationship between the monitoring of CEOs by inside and outside
directors and CEO resignations. He observed that there is a stronger association between
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prior performance and the probability of a resignation for companies with outsider dominated
boards than for companies with insider dominated boards. Notably, this finding does not
appear to be a function of ownership effects, size effects or industry effects. McConnell and
Servaes (1990) conducted a study to empirically investigate the impact of equity ownership
on firm value using a sample of 1,173 firms for 1976 and 1,093 firms for 1986. They found a
curvilinear relationship between common stock owned by the insiders and value of the firm.
Moreover, they observed a positive relationship between institutional investors and value of
the firm. They found their results congruent with the hypothesis that firm value is a function
of the structure of equity ownership.
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) analyzed the data of nearly 400 large US firms to
explore the impact of different governance mechanisms to control the agency problem
between managers and shareholders and their effects on firm performance. Their results
indicate a positive association between insider shareholding and firm performance. However
they observed that the impact of insider shareholding on firm performance disappeared when
it is estimated along with other variables included in their study. They found a negative
relationship between outside directors and firm performance. They suggest that negative
relationship between outside directors and firm performance may be due to presence of too
many outside directors on the board. Baliga et al. (1996) analyzed the data of US
corporations during 1980 to 1991 to examine the effects of CEO duality on performance.
Their results indicate that market is indifferent to the changes in a firm’s leadership structure
i.e. unitary leadership or dual leadership. Moreover, they found a little support that operating
performance change due to alterations in duality structure. In addition, they found a weak
relationship that the firm’s long-term performance is affected due to changes in duality
structure. Yermack (1996) analyzed the data of 452 large US industrial companies during
1984-1991 to investigate the impact of board size on firm value. He observed an inverse
relationship between board size and the value of the firm.
Opler et al. (1999) analyzed the data of US firms during 1971-1994 to investigate the
important factors that affect the corporate cash holdings. They observed that firms with
riskier activities and with strong growth opportunities tend to hold more cash. On the other
hand, firms that have easy access to capital markets tend to hold less cash. They found a little
support regarding excess cash has a large short run impact on capital expenditures, dividend
payout to shareholders, and acquisition spending. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) analyzed the
data of 348 largest firms in Australia to investigate the relationship between board
demographics and firm value. Their results indicate that board size is positively related to
firm value. Moreover, their findings show a positive association between the proportion of
inside directors and performance.
Mak and Kusandi (2005) analyzed the data of Singaporean and Malaysian firms
during 1999-2000 to investigate the impact of corporate governance variables on firm value.
Their results indicate that corporate governance mechanisms partially affect the firm value.
More importantly, they have shown an inverse relationship between board size and firm value
which confirms the finding of earlier empirical studies such as Yermack (1996) and
Eisenberg et al. (1998). Abor and Biekpe (2007) analyzed the data of small and medium
enterprises in Ghana. Their results show that board composition, board size, CEO duality,
inside ownership, foreign ownership, level of management skill and family business are some
factors that positively affect the firm performance. Moreover, their findings suggest that the
code of corporate governance provides assistance to small and medium enterprises by
instilling better management practices and in turn positively influence their performance.
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) analyzed the data of US firms during 1990-2003 to
investigate how corporate governance effects firm value by comparing the value and use of
cash holdings in poorly and well-governed firms. They observed that governance has material
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effects on value through its impact on cash. For instance, one dollar of cash in a poorly
governed firm is valued at only forty two cents to eighty eight cents. Good governance
approximately doubles this value. Furthermore, they have shown that firms with poor
corporate governance waste cash quickly in ways that significantly reduce the firm
performance. However, the negative affect of large cash holdings on future operating
performance may be wiped out if the firm is well-governed.
Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008) analyzed the data of companies listed in Tehran stock
exchange during 2005-2006 to investigate the impact of different attributes of corporate
governance on three different measures of firm performance namely return on assets,
earnings per share and return on equity. Their results indicate that board size is negatively
related to firm performance. Moreover, their findings suggest that presence of independent
directors on the board improves the firm performance. They observed no relationship
between CEO duality and firm performance. Furthermore, they observed that presence of
institutional investors on the boards is unrelated to firm performance. Kusandi (2011)
analyzed the data of firms listed on Singapore and Kuala Lumpur stock exchanges during
2000-2005 to estimate the relationship between firm level governance mechanisms and cash
holdings along with their combined effects on firm value. He observed that internal
governance mechanisms such as board characteristics and ownership concentration are
important predictors of corporate cash holdings. Moreover, his findings suggest that firms
with poor governance hold more cash. The results of the study also suggests that incremental
holding of excess cash is negatively related to firms with unitary leadership structure, firms
with pyramidal ownership structure, and family controlled firms. Finally, shareholders tend to
pay less for those firms if they anticipate that these firms are prone to more severe agency
problems.
Sheikh et al. (2013) analyzed the data of 154 firms listed on Karachi stock exchange
during 2004-2008 to investigate the impact of internal attributes of corporate governance
namely board size, board composition, CEO duality, managerial ownership and ownership
concentration on firm performance measured as earnings per share, return on assets, return on
equity and market-to-book ratio. Their results indicate that outside directors, board size and
managerial ownership are negatively related to firm performance. Alternatively, ownership
concentration is positively related to firm performance. CEO duality is positively related to
earnings per share. Furthermore, they observed that leverage is negatively while firm size is
positively related to all measures of firm performance. Kumar and Singh (2013) analyzed the
data of 176 firms listed on Bombay stock exchange during 2008-2009 to examine the effects
of board size and promoter ownership on firm value. Their results indicate that board size is
negatively while promoter ownership is positively related to corporate performance.
Moreover, their results indicate that when proportion of promoter ownership is above than the
critical level of forty percent then promoters’ interest become aligned with the company and
in turn positively affect the performance. Sun and Wang (2013) analyzed the data of Chinese
listed firms to investigate the effects of corporate ownership structure on market value of
excess cash. They observed that state ownership has a positive effect, as the market value of
excess cash is greater in state owned firms than in privately controlled firms. Moreover, they
observed that expropriation by controlling shareholders is significantly higher in privately
controlled firms than in state owned firms and increases with excess cash. They found their
results consistent with the view that the market believes controlling shareholders are more
likely to extract the private benefits associated with cash reserves. Rehman and Wang (2015)
analyzed the data of Chinese listed firms during 2001-2013 to understand the adjustment of
speed of corporate cash holdings and to explore the factors that affect the corporate cash
holdings. Their results indicate a lower adjustment coefficients for Chinese listed firms
compared to firms in developed countries. Moreover, they found that operating cash flow,
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firm size, leverage, capital expenditures and net working capital are negatively while growth
is positively related to corporate cash holdings. Furthermore, they observed that board
independence shows an ambiguous relationship with corporate cash holdings. Alternatively,
board size shows a significant negative relationship with corporate cash holdings. Sheikh and
Khan (2015) analyzed the data of non-financial firms listed on Karachi stock exchange
during 2008-2012 to examine the effects of board attributes and insider ownership on cash
holdings. They observed that board independence is positively while insider ownership is
negatively related to corporate cash holdings. Moreover, they observed that family firms hold
more cash than the non-family firms.
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data
This paper empirically investigates the impact of excess cash, board attributes, and insider
ownership on the value of the firm. The data were taken from annual reports of companies
listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) Pakistan during 2008-2012. Stock price data
were obtained from the publications of KSE. All non-financial firms listed on KSE during
2008-2012 were included in the study however firms with incomplete data relevant to
variables used in the study were deleted from analysis. Resultantly, final sample set consists
of 189 firms over a period of 5 years. Firms included in the sample belongs to different
industrial groups/sectors such as automobile and parts, chemical, construction and materials,
electricity, engineering, food producers and beverages, general industries, household goods,
pharmaceutical and bio-tech and textile.
3.2 Variables
Table 1 presents the definitions of variables. Definitions are largely adopted from Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Kusnadi (2011).
Table 1: Definition of Variables
Proxy
Variable
Definition
Dependent variable
FVit
Ratio of market value of equity + book value total
liabilities to net assets. Net assets defined as the difference
Firm value
between total assets and cash & cash equivalents.
Independent variables
ECASH it
Difference between actual cash and predicted cash. In other
Excess Cash
words, it is the residual of a cash levels regression.
BS
it
Board Size
Natural log of total number of directors on the board.
BI it
Board
Ratio of independent non-executive directors on the board
Independence
to total directors on the board.
CEODit
Dummy variable, 1 if chairman of the board is also the
CEO or the managing director of the company, 0
CEO Duality
otherwise.
INS it
Ratio of controlling rights held by the directors, their
Insider Ownership
spouse and family members.
Control variables
LEVit
Leverage
Ratio of total liabilities to net assets.
SIZEit
Natural log of net assets.
Firm size
DIV
it
Dividend
Ratio of total cash dividend to net assets.

33

AABFJ | Volume 10, no. 1, 2016

3.3 Research Methodology
The pooled ordinary least squares method used to estimate the combined effects of excess
cash and internal governance indicators on firm value. First of all, we have computed the
amount of excess cash defined as the difference between actual and predicted cash. In other
words, the excess cash is the residual of a cash levels regression. Consistent with Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith (2007) the amount of excess cash is determined using the following equation:
CH it   0  1 SIZE it   2 MV it   3 NWC it   4 CFit   5 CE it   it .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .....(1)

where CHit is corporate cash holdings measured as natural log of the ratio of cash & cash
equivalent to net assets. SIZEit is firm size measured as natural log of net assets, MVit is
market value of equity defined as ratio of market value equity to net assets, NWCit is net
working capital defined as ratio of the difference between current assets and current liabilities
to net assets. CFit is free cash flow defined as ratio of earnings after taxes to net assets, CEit is
capital expenditures defined as ratio of capital expenditures to net assets.
After determining the value of excess cash, equation 2 estimate the effects of excess cash on
firm value.
FV it   0   1 ECASH it   2 LEV it   3 SIZE it   4 DIV it   it .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... ..( 2 )

After that combined effects of excess cash and board attributes on firm value are estimated as
follows.
FV it   0  1 ECASH it   2 BS it   3 BI it   4 CEOD it   5 ( ECASH it  BS it )   6 ( ECASH it  BI it )   7 ( ECASH it  CEOD it )
  8 LEV it   9 SIZE it  10 DIV it   it .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... ..( 3)

Moreover, combined effect of excess cash and insider ownership on firm value is determined
as follows.
FV it   0   1 INS it   2 ( ECASH it  INS it )   3 LEV it   4 SIZE it   5 DIV it   it .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... ( 4 )

4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation of Variables
Descriptive statistics is presented in Table 2. The mean firm value, measured as market value
of equity plus book value total liabilities to net assets, is 1.16. The mean value of excess cash
is too low which is computed by taking the difference between the actual and predicted cash.
The mean value of natural log of board size is 0.894. The mean CEO duality is 19.6 percent
which indicates the cases in which one person holds both positions (i.e. chairperson of board
of directors and CEO). Mean insider ownership is 55.5 percent which indicates the proportion
of direct and indirect voting rights of directors and their spouse or family members. Mean
leverage is 55.8 percent indicating the proportion of net assets financed through total
liabilities. The mean natural log of net assets, a proxy for firm size, is 15.15. Finally, mean
dividends are 2.2 percent which indicates the proportion of cash dividend distributed among
the shareholders in relation to firms’ net assets.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean
SD
Minimum Maximum
FVit
945 1.160
1.025 0.243
9.185
ECASH it
945 -1.12e-08 1.435 -7.47
3.538
BS it
945 0.894
0.070 0.778
1.204
BI it
945 0.182
0.265 0.000
0.928
CEODit
945 0.196
0.397 0.000
1.000
INS it
945 0.555
0.231 0.000
0.992
LEVit
945 0.558
0.187 0.002
1.061
SIZEit
945 15.15
1.418 11.91
19.71
DIVit

945

0.022

0.049 0.000
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Table 3 presents the correlations of variables. Excess cash is positively related to firm value
but the relationship is insignificant. Board size is significantly positively related to firm value
and excess cash. Board independence is significant and positively related to excess cash and
board size. CEO duality is significant and negatively related to board size whereas it is
positively related to board independence. Institutional ownership is significantly positively
related to firm value and CEO duality whereas it is negatively related to board size and board
independence. As control variables are concerned, leverage is significantly positively related
to excess cash and institutional ownership. Firm size is significantly positively related to firm
value and board size while it is negatively related to CEO duality. Finally, dividends are
significant and positively related to firm value, excess cash, board size and firm size whereas
dividends are negatively related to CEO duality and leverage. In sum, the size of the
coefficients does not suggest any serious problem of multicollinearity among the explanatory
variables.
Table 3: Correlation Matrix
Variable

FVit

ECASH it

BS it

BI it

CEODit

INS it

LEVit

SIZEit

DIVit

FVit

1.000
0.029
0.211***
-0.028
-0.050
0.145***
-0.018
0.077**
0.633***

1.000
0.098***
0.096***
-0.018
-0.072
0.161***
0.001
0.093***

1.000
0.053*
-0.188***
-0.111***
-0.047
0.378***
0.286***

1.000
0.075**
-0.146***
0.043
-0.014
-0.030

1.000
0.069**
0.034
-0.083**
-0.060*

1.000
0.081**
-0.029
0.040

1.000
0.020
-0.162***

1.000
0.197***

1.000

ECASH it

BS it
BI it
CEODit
INS it

LEVit
SIZEit
DIVit

***,**,* Significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively
4.2 Regression Results
Regression results of equation 2, 3 and 4 are presented in Table 4. Results of equation 2
indicate that excess cash is statistically significant and negatively related to firm value.
Results of equation 3 indicate that board size is significant and negatively related to firm
value. Interaction of board independence and excess cash, and interaction of CEO duality and
excess cash are positively related to firm value but the relationship is statistically
insignificant. Regression results of equation 4 show that the interaction of excess cash and
insider ownership is significant and negatively related to firm value. The control variables
introduced in the regression equations have shown consistent results. For instance, leverage
and dividends are statistically significant and positively related to firm value. Alternatively,
firm size is significant and negatively related to firm value. The value of R 2 is looking
reasonable and appear to be able to explain most of the cross-section variation in firm value.
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Table 4: Regression Results of Equation (2), (3) and (4)
Variable
Eq. (2)
Eq. (3)
Eq. (4)
***
1.159
0.198
0.857***
C
(2.96)
(4.06)
(0.50)
ECASH it
-0.034*
0.958***
0.041
(-1.90)
(4.22)
(0.98)
BS it
1.229***
(2.97)
BI it
-0.029
(-0.31)
CEODit
-0.026
(-0.40)
INS it
0.475***
(4.30)
-1.120***
( ECASH it  BS it )
(-4.43)
0.018
( ECASH it  BI it )
(0.29)
0.005
( ECASH it  CEODit )
(0.11)
-0.128*
( ECASH it  INS it )
(-1.79)
***
***
LEVit
0.635
0.485***
0.537
(3.82)
(4.51)
(3.46)
SIZEit
-0.051***
-0.036**
-0.040**
(-2.20)
(-2.65)
(-1.97)
DIVit
13.740*** 13.606*** 13.55**
(25.50)
(24.85)
(25.34)
2
0.413
0.429
0.426
R
0.410
0.423
0.422
Adj. R 2
F-Statistic
165.5
70.35
116.2
Prob. (F –Statistic)
0.000
0.000
0.000
***,**,* Significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively
(t-statistic given in parenthesis)
5. Discussion on Empirical Results
Empirical results presented in Table 4 indicate that excess cash is negatively related to firm
value. The negative relationship may be because of three reasons. First, corporate managers
are conservative and prefer to hold more cash for transactional as well as safety motives due
to uneven economic condition in the country. Moreover, holding more than optimal level of
cash motivates the managers to invest it at below the cost of capital or waste it on
organizational inefficiencies. Second, due to underdeveloped capital market in the country
managers may not able to find highly liquid securities to earn a positive return on temporarily
idle cash. Third, indigent corporate governance (i.e. improper monitoring) may encourage the
managers to waste cash in ways that significantly reduce the corporate performance.
Combined effects of excess cash and board size are significant and negatively related to firm
value. The negative relationship between board size and firm value is congruent with earlier
empirical studies which suggest that smaller boards are more effective than bigger boards
because bigger boards may become the cause of delays in decision making which in turn
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negatively influence the performance. The negative relationship of board size on firm value is
consistent with the findings of Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998), Mak and Kusnadi
(2005), Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008), Ksunadi (2011), Kumar and Singh (2013). Finally,
combined effects of excess cash and insider ownership are significant and negatively related
to firm value. The negative relationship may be due to the reason that ownership
concentration makes the managers more conservative and in turn confine them to hold more
cash than required to support the operations. Thus increase in opportunity cost due to holding
more than optimal level of cash may be an important reason for negative affect of excess cash
on firm value.
Leverage is positively related to firm value. The positive relationship confirm
Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) proposition suggesting that managers should use maximum
debt in their capital structure due to tax deductible interest payment which in turn reduce the
effective cost of debt and increase the firm value. Moreover, the positive relationship
between leverage and firm value is consistent with Jensen’s predictions (1986) suggesting
that debt can be an effective device to mitigate the free cash problem between managers and
shareholders. Thus reduction in agency problem creates a positive impact on firm value.
Dividends are positively related to firm value. The positive relationship is congruent with the
prophecy of bird-in-the-hand theory suggesting that distribution of dividends increase the
market price of shares and reduces the cost of equity. Firm size is negatively related to firm
value. The negative relationship may be due to the reasons that sample firms may not able to
take the benefits of scale economies due to their size which in turn negatively affect the
performance. In summary, findings of this study indicate that excess cash and internal
governance measures have material effects on firm value.
6. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether excess cash, board attributes and insider
ownership affect the value of the firm. Empirical results indicate that excess cash is
negatively related to firm value. The negative relationship may be due to conservative
financing policy adopted by the managers due to uneven economic condition in the country.
However, holding more than optimal level of cash motivates the managers to invest it at
below the cost of capital or waste it on organizational inefficiencies which in turn negatively
affect the corporate performance. In addition, weak corporate governance in the country may
encourage the managers to waste cash in ways that significantly reduce the performance.
Excess cash along with board size is significant and negatively related to firm value. The
negative relationship between board size and firm value is congruent with earlier empirical
studies suggesting that smaller boards are more effective than bigger boards. Excess cash
along with insider ownership is significant and negatively related to firm value. The negative
relationship may be due to the reason that ownership concentration makes the managers more
conservative and in turn they may hold more cash than required to support the operations.
Thus high opportunity cost may be an important reason for negative impact of excess cash on
firm value. Leverage is positively related to firm value. The positive relationship confirm the
predictions of Modigliani and Miller (1963) suggesting that managers should use maximum
debt in their capital structure due to tax deductible interest payment. Moreover, the positive
relationship is consistent with Jensen’s predictions (1986) suggesting that debt can be an
effective tool to mitigate the agency problems between managers and shareholders. Thus
reduction in agency problems may positively affect the firm value. Dividends are positively
related to firm value. The positive relationship is consistent with the bird-in-the-hand theory
suggesting that distribution of dividends increase the value of the firm. Firm size is
negatively related to firm value. The negative relationship may be due to the reasons that
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small firms in the country may not able to enjoy the benefits of scale economies which in turn
negatively affects the performance.
In summary, findings of this study indicate that excess cash and internal governance
indicators are important predictors of firm value. Moreover, findings of this study have laid
some groundwork upon which a more detailed evaluation of cash along with other attributes
of corporate governance on firm value could be based. We believe that findings of this study
surely provide support to the corporate managers in determining the cash levels that increase
the firm value. Moreover, findings of this study provide support to regulatory authorities to
formulate regulations that improve the level of corporate governance in the country.
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